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I. INTRODUCTION
In today's combat analysis coinmunity there exists a pleth-
ora of outstanding combat models. Unfortunately, few of these
models deal in any great detail with the logistics activities
which form an integral, though often overlooked, part of the
combat process. Many logistics activities, which can be
termed combat subfunctions , are easily modelled. Indeed,
such models as MAWLOGS , LOGATAK and MASC [4] are premier
examples of relatively high resolution logistics models. But,
just as the combat models either exclude logistics support
altogether or include it in such a simplified format as to
obviate any insight, so too, the logistics models tend to
use rather weak combat models and therefore produce results
which are not as useable as they could be.
This thesis presents a parametic model which allows the
investigation of the recovery and evacuation of combat dam-
aged tracked vehicles fighting in a defensive environment.
The parametric analysis of recovery and evacuation techniques
m.odel (PARET) is a user interactive, TI-59 programmable cal-
culator model which provides the following outputs:
a) red and blue force combat losses
b) time available for recovery




d) expected time to perform the recovery
e) expected number of recovery vehicles lost to enemy
action
f) expected distribution of vehicles recovered by mainte-
nance echelon required to return them to the user
g) expected time of combat vehicle return to the user
h) actual clock (elapsed) time
i) expected number of heavy equipment transporters required
for a combat brigade.
PARET uses a hybridized, Lanchester based routine which
produces both battle casualties and the time of battle for
each engagement. In this manner, any red and blue force levels
may be used to determine the overall impact on the recovery
and evacuation processes. Battle time is determined in a
purely deterministic manner; that is, it is dependent solely
on the initial red and blue force levels and the user supplied
red break point. The blue casualty level for each engagement
is determined by the size of the starting blue force and the
battle time computation. Since the blue force's combat effec-
tiveness will decrease over time due to attrition by the red
force, this model employs a variable exchange ratio instead of
the more traditional attrition rates usually found in a Lan-
chestrian formulation.
Since the series of engagements being modelled is expected
.to last for several days, PARET keeps track of elapsed time
in addition to the time for each engagement. Night and day
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operations are played by the model by changing several param-
eters when the program determines night has fallen, and
changes them back to their original values when sufficient
time has elapsed for it to be daytime again. Additionally,
the model includes the "fix forward" concept of maintenance
operations, which means that some percentage of combat dam-
aged vehicles can be fixed during the engagement period, and
therefore will not need recovery or evacuation assets.
Functionally, PARET is arranged in four basic modules
which perform the following tasks :
Module A: Module A determines battle time, red and blue
casualties, the time available for recovery of the blue
casualties and the expected number of recovery vehicles lost
to hostile fire. In addition, this module determines the
expected percentage of recoveries made using the daisy chain-
ing technique of recoveiry, and when not using it. It allows
the user to decide which recovery tactic to use. Once the
recovery tactic is decided upon, the expected time to recover
the casualties is displayed.
Module B: This module is a statistics generating and
gathering program which uses the output from module A to
determine the expected number of vehicles recovered based
on the time available for recovery, computes the expected
number of M, F and K kills which will be going to organiza-
tional and direct support maintenance (by type vehicle)
,
and after computing elapsed time, resets certain parameters
12

depending on whether the conditions to be played are night or
day conditions. Output from module B is then stored in the
data base for use by the subsequent modules.
Module C: Module C uses the maintenance distribution
generated in module B to compute expected times of return to
the using unit for each combat vehicle. In addition, this
module determines the distribution of maintenance for the
recovery vehicles lost in combat, and computes the expected
number of recovery vehicles which will be available to begin
the next engagement (based on operational readiness rates)
.
Module D: Based on total numbers actually recovered,
this module computes the expected number of heavy equipment
transporters which will be required to carry the combat dam-
aged vehicles to both direct support and general support
maintenance units. It then computes the expected time of
return of these equipment transporters to the maintenance
collection point.
Chapter IV gives a detailed discussion of the construc-
tion of each module including the specific assumptions used.
Several test cases using the model were run, and these cases
along with detailed output are presented in Chaper V. Chap-
ter VI presents the decision process used in determining re-
covery tactics, which vehicles to recover, and the mix of
recovery vehicles to use, based on the parameters of the
.model. The general scenario used, a logistics primer
and the model methodology are presented in Chapter II and III,
13

The PARET model exhibits many of the strengths and weak-
nesses of both the combat and logistics models now in use;
however, its primary strength lies in the substantial flex-
ibility gained by developing a model for the parametric analy-






This thesis deals with a two- fold problem. First, it
deals with the development of a logical, parametric approach
to the analysis of the recovery and subsequent evacuation of
combat vehicles for a force in a defense posture on a high
intensity, conventional battlefield. Secondly, and as a logic-
al- next step, the decision process used in these two pro-
cesses is analyzed.
To address both of these problems, a parametric model was
built which uses the TI-59 programmable calculator as its ve-
hicle. Although the calculator has many disadvantages for
large scale analysis, its inherent power for the analysis of
combat subfunctions has not yet been fully exploited. To the
author's knowledge, PARET is the first medium scale logistics





Although recovery and evacuation operations in an offen-
sive environment are not trivially easy, they are several
powers of magnitude easier when compared to the same opera-
tions in a defensive environment. During delaying actions,
combat damaged vehicles and those which become casualties
through maintenance failure must be expeditiously recovered,
15

evacuated to the proper level of maintenance, and then re-
turned to the user. A failure to recover puts an additional
weapon into the hands of the continuously advancing enemy.
The PARET model uses a battlefield on which a series of
pitched battles between armored forces is fought. Figure 2-1
displays this battlefield. In general, the situation is such
that a blue force of brigade size is defending against a red
force of division size. As Chapter V points out, in the cases
which were run using the model, the red force was given un-
limited resources; it attacked with all or part of a division
against the remaining blue force in each engagement. PARET
does not explicitly play terrain, but as Chapter IV points
out, it can be modelled and played indirectly. All battles
are considered to take place in the division main battle
area. Chapter III discusses the exact force ratios considered,
When a delaying action is being played, one of the most
critical parameters to be considered is the spacing of the
red force echelons. Second only to spacing is the speed at
which those echelons approach the blue force. The 5 km spac-
ing shown in Figure 2-1 is the spacing employed in PARET.
That parameter, however, can be easily changed in the model,
as Chapter IV indicates. Second (and succeeding) echelon
rates of advance are a user input parameter which can be
changed at will in each iteration.
All of the forces normally found in units of the type


























considers only the tracked weapon systems in both the red
and blue forces. Specifically, the recovery and evacuation
of only main battle tanks and TOW weapon systems is considered,
Further, only those systems are used when considering the
size of the blue force. Similarly, to compute the size of
the red force, only main battle tanks and anti-tank weapons
(SAGGER, BMP) are considered. Although the scope of this anal-
ysis_is„ intentionally limited, tracked combat vehicles will
be the bulk of the effort in terms of the recovery and evacua-
tion effort.
It is important to note that although Figure 2-1 presents
an idealized battlefield, the model is not necessarily tied
to any particular fixed situation. That is, the spacing be-
tween blue alternate battle positions, the red echelon spac-
ing, and the size of the opposing forces are all user inputs
to the model through direct interaction or through directly
changing an appropriate line of code in the program itself.
Further details impacting on the specifics of the particular
scenario played are explained in Chapter III.
C. LOGISTICS PRIMER
The lexicon of combat and combat analysis is relatively
well known. Most analysts (and many commanders) , however,
feel uncomfortable when they must deal with the mysterious
world of logistics. As an aid to the reader, the following
listing of terms common to the areas of logistical support
this thesis deals with should prove helpful.
18

Recovery ; the process of removing combat damaged, mired,
or otherwise immobile vehicle from the battlefield. During
combat, a vehicle is recovered to a maintenance collection
point. Recovery is the first, and often most difficult,
stage in the cycle which eventually will return that vehicle
to the user.
Evacuation ; the process of moving inoperable equipment
from the maintenance collection point to the appropriate
maintenance activity. Evacuation of tracked vehicles is nor-
mally accomplished by heavy equipment transporters, capable
of travelling at relatively high rates of speed over good
roads.
Heavy Equipment Transporter ; a tractor-trailer combina-
tion used to move disabled tracked vehicles from the mainte-
nance collection point to the appropriate level of maintenance
In common parlance, the heavy equipment transporter is the
HET. Currently, the HET is a combination of either a 22 1/2
ton, 15 ton, or 10 ton tractor with an M747 trailer. The
HET is capable of carrying a main battle tank over good roads
at speeds up to 40 MPH.
Maintenance Collection Point ; the area to which dis-
abled vehicles are recovered and subsequently evacuated from.
The MCP is generally located 10 to 15 km behind the forward
edge of the battle area (FEBA) . Elements of the direct sup-
port maintenance company, along with organizational mainte-
nance personnel, are located at the MCP and provide on-site
19

repairs and inspection. If repairs cannot be performed here,
the disabled vehicle is evacuated to the direct support com-
pany further in the rear where appropriate disposition will
be made
.
Level of Maintenance : there are four levels of mainte-
nance in the US Army maintenance system:
a) organizational: capable of minor repairs such as one
might find at a civilian service station. Each company and
batallion has organic organizational maintenance personnel.
b) direct support: capable of more extensive repairs
than the organizational level, but limited to such tasks as
engine replacement. In general, the direct support (DS)
maintenance level replaces defective major components of all
vehicular systems including armament and fire control. Each
combat brigade has a DS maintenance company attached to it.
Usually, this company is located as near the FEBA as is prac-
tical to afford support. Additionally, the divisional direct
support batallion has a DS company (rear) which is located
35 to 50 km behind the FEBA. This rear DS company provides
additional backup to each forward company,
c) general support: capable of the highest level of field
repair. The GS company provides support in those areas which
the DS company lacks capability, provides backup DS capability
for overflow, and provides rebuild of those major components
which the DS company exchanges. The GS company is usually
located 100 km from the FEBA to avoid frequent displacements




d) depot: capable of repair up to total overhaul of
entire systems. Depot maintenance is comparable to sending
the vehicle back to the manufacturer for repairs. Usually,
the depot facility will be located in CONUS , or so far to
the rear that evacuation to this level generally requires
issuances of a replacement vehicle to the using unit.
Recovery Vehicle ; one of three types of vehicles used
to haul a disabled vehicle from the battle site to the MCP.
The following recovery vehicles are now in the inventory:
a) M88: a full tracked, medium armored vehicle capable
of recovering the main battle tank.
b) M578: a full tracked, lightly armored vehicle capable
of recovering self propelled artillery, the Infantry Fight-
ing Vehicle (IFV), the Improved TOW Vehicle (ITV) , or any ve-
hicle in the armored personnel carrier class.
c) M553: a wheeled, 10 ton wrecker designed for recovery
of wheeled vehicles, but capable of recovering the IFV/ITV
class of vehicles under favorable conditions.
Daisy Chaining : the process of recovering more than one
disabled vehicle with only one recovery vehicle. The tracked
recovery vehicles are capable of recovering several other ve-
hicles simultaneously, but the time to rig the vehicles for
towing and the towing speed change markedly.
Self/Like Recovery : a recovery effected by a vehicle of
•the same type, or recovery performed by the vehicle itself.
In many cases, it is expeditious to perform recovery through
21

this method, both to conserve recovery assets for more demand-
ing missions, and to save valuable time which would otherwise
be wasted in waiting for the recovery vehicles to arrive at
the site of failure. For example, a tank which has suffered
only a firepower kill would be able to recover itself, and
could be used for the recovery of other, more seriously dam-
aged, vehicles.
The limitations and capabilities of the various recovery
vehicles above can be found in the Battlefield Recovery and
Evacuation Capabilties Study [3] . Other logistics terms
used in this thesis will be explained as they are presented.
In war, many of the problems which the logistician will
face will require unique solutions not dreamt of even ten
years ago. The methods of combat are dynamic, and so too
must be the methods of supporting the fighters. A defensive
environment will require the logistics system to support an
Army in the field with little backup for an extended period
of time, a time critical to our ultimate survival. The PARET
model provides yet another tool for the analysis of one of
the primary combat subfunctions , the recovery and evacuation





During the last ten years, the general trend in the com-
bat analysis community has been to devise highly complex
computer models capable of providing detailed output to answer
an unlimited number of detailed questions. These high reso-
lution models, such as STAR (a Simulation of Tactical Alterna-
tive Responses) which was developed at the Naval Postgraduate
School, allow the total analysis of nearly any conceivable
tactic or weapon system. Through technical evolution in the
state of the modelling art, high resolution models have es-
tablished a permanent niche for themselves in the decision
maker's arena.
The dynamic nature of combat has spawned the demand for
ever increasing complexity in the models used by analysts.
Unfortunately, the complex model creates complex demands for
extensive data input, ponderous amounts of annual maintenance
man hours, and a great deal of time for the analysis of the
output data. Cumbersome as they are, the high resolution mod-
els are valuable tools which are necessary in most modelling
applications in the defense industry. Often, the computer
simulation is the only source of answers posed by senior com-
manders; still more often, those same simulations pose ques-
tions not yet dreamed of by commanders or analysts.
23

while recognizing the intrinsic need for models such as
STAR, it is the purpose of this thesis to present an alterna-
tive approach to the increasing complexity running rampant
in the modelling community. Many of the combat subfunctions
in the area of logistics are easily modelled in a parametric
form. Too often, a logistics function is put into a high
resolution combat model before that function is thoroughly
understood. This lack of understanding of the parameters
which enter the overall equation cause improper conclusions
to be drawn regarding the nature of the logistics function
under study. Since all of the functions in combat are inter-
related, a basic misunderstanding of any one will generate a
less than adequate understanding of the total process.
The intent of PARET is to present the analytical commu-
nity with a quick, inexpensive and highly useable tool for
the in-depth investigation of the parameters influencing how
and why tracked vehicles are recovered from the battlefield,
evacuated to the appropriate level of maintenance, and then
returned to the using unit. Technical evolution in the com-
puter industry has brought added innovation in the field of
hand-held programming as well. PARET will not provide the
voluminous, detailed output characteristic of the computer
simulation; it will provide the analyst a means of conducting
exhaustive sensitivity analyses on the parameters surround-
ing battlefield recovery and evacuation in a timely and very
inexpensive manner. As Chapter V points out, the data collected
24

from the test cases run on the model compare very favorably
with data generated in large scale simulations, and in some
cases, provide new insights into the processes under study.
B. ASSUMPTIONS
In order to focus on the particular areas to be studied,
the following general assumptions were made for ease of
modelling:
a) fuel and ammunition resupply are not considered
b) no recovery missions are refused
c) recovery crews are always available for every recovery
vehicle
d) the model is independent of the type of control (cen-
tralized or decentralized) exercised over the recovery
vehicles
e> terrain is not directly of interest
The description of each module, in Chapter IV, includes the
specific assumptions used in the construction of that par-
ticular module.
C. PARAMETERS ANALYZED
As Chapter II pointed out, the PARET battlefield is
designated to include one brigade's area of operations. The
hypothetical blue brigade consists of two mechanized infantry
batallions and two armored battalions. A combination of one
batallion of each type forms a battalion combat team which
occupies adjoining battle positions on the battlefield.
25

Only tanks and anti-tank weapons are considered when the size
of the force is computed. Throughout the remainder of this
thesis, the word TOW is taken to mean the family of the ve-
hicular mounted weapon systems which include the TOW missile.
Each blue force battalion team consists of the following weap-
ons mix: 54 tanks, 88 TOW's (142 total systems). Similarly,
the opposing red division is composed of only two primary
weapon systems, tanks and anti-tank weapons. For the purpose
of this model, the red force division is composed of two mech-
anized rifle regiments and one armor regiment. One red force
regimental team is composed of 57 tanks and 119 anti-tank
weapons (176 total weapon systems) . Although this force ratio
appears to be less than 3:1, recall that these red regimental
teams will appear on the battlefield incessantly, opposing a
steadily dwindling blue force.
The primary attribute of the red force for the purposes
of this model is its belief in the principle of momentum.
That is, the red force will advance with the maximum mass it
can muster at the highest attainable speed. At the beginning
of each iteration, the size of both the blue and red forces
are entered by the user. Additionally, the user inputs the
rate of advance of the succeeding red echelon. The red force
rate of advance turns out to be one of the most critical
parameters for successful recovery operations in the defen-
sive environment. PARET does not play any other weapon
systems than those already mentioned, insofar as model
26

components. However, artillery fire is played indirectly in
the model. Blue indirect fire is allowed to slow the red rate
of advance for each of the succeeding echelons, and red indi-
rect fire is considered in the attrition of the blue recovery
vehicles. Successful interdiction of the red rate of advance
is as important to recovery and evacuation operations as the
operational readiness of the blue recovery vehicles.
It is conceivable that the red force divisions would be
separated by as much as 20 km during the movement to contact.
To model the maximum strain on the blue recovery system, this
spacing was not played in PARET. If these spacings had been
played, the series of engagements described in Chapter V would
have turned out considerably different since that additional
time would allow more blue replacements to re-enter the bat-
tle. Chapter IV discusses how this additional time factor
can be modelled, and Chapter V displays some data which has
been modified to incorporate the added time.
Blue and red force maneuvers were not considered in the
formation of the model. Undoubtedly, maneuvering will take
place during the time of battle at the red and blue company/
battalion level. However, when the entire red force is
considered, its movement generally in a straight line through
the blue area is a reasonable assumption to make. Similarly,
the blue force will employ some type of maneuver when it
.breaks contact and moves to the next battle position. Again
the movement to the alternate battle position is assumed to
27

to be in a straight line. No extra time was considered for
the blue passage of lines.
D. TACTICS CONSIDERED
Blue Force: Two tactics were considered for the defend-
ing force. First, the blue force was divided into two battal-
ion teams as described above. Each team occupied a battle
position, and these positions were set at a distance of 4 km
from each other. When the red force reached its pre-set
breakpoint, the blue force then withdrew to its next battle
position (already prepared) , 8 km from the first. The advanc-
ing red force, then, would meet fresh blue forces in the
first two battles, and the same blue force during alternate
battles after the second. Upon reaching the point where only
50% of the blue battalion team was still alive, the battalion
teams would consolidate forces on the next battle position,
continuing to fight in the manner just described until the
remaining force reached the 50% level. At that point (71 blue
weapon systems alive) the problem was terminated.
The second tactic considered for the blue force involved
setting up the battle field identically to that above. How-
ever, in this case, the original blue battalion team stood
and fought on the first battle position until it reached the
50% level. It then broke contact and moved to the position
of the second battalion team, combined forces, and waited for
the next battle. Battle termination came when the blue force
had 71 systems left alive on the battlefield.
28

Red Forces: Each red force regimental team fought until
it reached its pre-set breakpoint (in the permanent data base)
.
When the breakpoint was reached, the red force went into the
hasty defensive posture while it waited for the next echelon
to catch up to it. Time was allotted for the rollup of the
red force and an expected time for it to begin to move forward
again was computed. For the cases examined in Chapter V, the
red force went into hasty defense when it reached the 40%
survivor level.
These tactics are not representative of all the tactical
decisions available to the commander. They did, however,
provide a suitable framework in which to study the recovery
and evacuation processes. The 40% survivor breakpoint for
the red force made each battle a little longer than the one
which preceeded it since the blue force was continually being
attrited by the red force. Blue attrition of the red force
meant little in the practical sense since the red force was
allowed to be virtually limitless. PARET assumes continuous
combat in the sense that the only idle time for a blue ele-
ment is the time in which it is travelling to its next posi-
tion, and the time it takes the red column to again make
contact. In combination, these factors allowed the analysis





Chapter V presents all cases considered in the trial runs
of the PARET model. To gather the data used in the analysis,
a worksheet was constructed which allowed the transcription
of the data as it came from the calculator. One of the most
significant disadvantages of using the hand-held calculator
for an analysis of this sort is that of data collection. As
Chapter IV will point out, it is possible to collect some of
the data internally in the model, but a large portion of it
must be collected iteratively as the model is running.
Enough additional room has been allocated to each card of
the program to allow data collection routines to be added,
but this was not done for this study in order that all of
the elements of the process could be studied in greater
detail.
For example, module D predicts how many HET ' s will be
required for the brigade. But the prediction process begins
at each battle termination in a sequence of battles. That
is, the user must manually tally how many HET's he has; if
the prediction is less than the number now on hand, no ad-
ditional HET's are required. A routine to output only the
additional HET requirement is easy to add to this module,




In this chapter, the PARET model is discussed in detail.
Appendix A is the complete user's manual for the model, in-
cluding a program listing which conforms to the descriptions
presented in each module. The design of the PARET model was
carefully considered to allow easy conversion for other mod-
els of calculators, or for conversion to either FORTRAN IV
or SIMSCRIPT. Before any conversion is attempted, however,
it is imperative that the reader carefully digest the descrip-
tion of each module. Modelling assumptions are included in
the discussion of each module, and the key to the successful
use of this model lies in the complete understanding of the
assumptions used, and how they may be changed through appro-
priate data entry.
The modular design of PARET allows each module to be used
as a separate, complete model in its own right. When PARET
is run in its entirety, the data base is updated for the use
of the succeeding module. Therefore, if modules are to be
used alone, care must be taken to insert proper parameters
in the data base. Annex C of Appendix A lists the complete
data base used in this presentation. Annex C is of particu-
lar use since nearly all specific assumptions to be described
are directly related to values in the data base. Parametric
changes in the data bas'e will allow the user to tailor PARET
for the analysis of particular situations.
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Note that only those data locations listed as permanent
will remain unchanged throughout the entire model. For the
other data locations, a cascading technique was employed
which means that data generated by a module and stored in a
data location will only remain unchanged through that module.
If further access ,to that particular data is required, the
data base and the coding of the module itself will have to be
altered. Also due to the cascaded data base, it is imperative
that the modules of PARET are run in sequence. Otherwise,
data required for a particular module's execution will not
be in place in the data base, and erroneous output will be
1
generated.
Chapter I outlined the primary functions of each of the
four modules in the PARET model. The modules compute other
data than that listed in the brief description already given.
In the discussion to follow, all of the functions of each
module are listed; the numbered entries describe the assump-
tions used in the development of each piece of the module.
A. MODULE A
This module performs the following functions:
a) computes the battle time for each battle based on the
initial red and blue starting forces and the red force
break point.




c) computes recovery vehicle travel time to the battle
site and to the MCP.
d) computes the time available for recovery of battle
damaged vehicles.
e) computes the number of disabled vehicles which must be
recovered by recovery vehicles (vice those which are
self/like recoverable)
,
f) computes red and blue survivors and battle termination.
g) computes the expected time to perform the recovery
assuming no attrition of recoveiry vehicles.
h) computes expected percentage of recovery without daisy
chaining.
i) computes expected percentage of recovery with daisy
chaining,
j) allows user selection of which recovery tactic to use.
k) computes the expected number of recovery vehicles killed
during movement to the battle site, on the battle site,
and during movement to the MCP.
1. Battle Time
Battle time, as used for the purposes of this model,
is that time in which the red and blue forces are in contact.
Red and blue force size, the postulated exchange ratio, and
the red break point all play important roles in the determina-
tion of the length of a particular battle. To achieve compu-
tational speed, a Lanchester type equation for determining
the battle time seemed appropriate. Since the blue force
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was postulated to be diminishing in relation to the red force
which was nearly constant for each battle, it was necessary
to modify the basic Lanchester fixed break point battle time
equations [2] to allow for an exchange ratio which was impli-
citly time dependent. Further, by assuming the force makeup
of Chapter III, it is possible to use homogeneous Lanchester
equations, since all weapon systems can be thought of as "tank
killers."
In the classical Lanchester approach, attrition rates
are postulated for each force, and these attrition rates are
held constant for any particular analysis. But, as the size
of the blue force diminishes in relation to the red force, the
intrinsic combat effectiveness of the blue force also dimin-
ishes with time. To allow for this contingency, PARET uses
an exchange ratio which is solely dependent on the size of
the blue force which begins any particular battle. By using
the initial force ratios (176 red, 142 blue) and assuming
that the defender has an initial exchange ratio of 5:1 (i.e.
one defender is killed for every five attackers) , the exchange
ratio can be defined by:
X=EXP(-(L) (BO)) (4-1)
where L is a constant defined by taking X = 5 when BO = 14 2.
BO in this case is the size of the blue force at the beginning
of any particular battle. The exponential form of exchange
ratio was used to give the blue forces less and less combat
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effectiveness as its size decreases through attrition. When
the blue force hits the 50% level of survivors, the value of
X is nearly 1, meaning that the blue force loses one weapon
system for each red system that it kills. Note that the as-
sumption is being made that combat effectiveness and exchange
ratios are roughly equivalent. If other than an initial 5:1
exchange ratio is desired, recompute the value of L and put
it into the permanent data base (see Appendix A, Annex C)
.
The actual computation of battle time involves the
use of two equations. Equation 4-2 is used whenever the ini-
tial force ratio (red/blue) is not equal to the square root
of the exchange ratio [2] . When the preceeding condition is
not met, equation 4-3 is automatically selected to determine
battle time.
TB = x"'''ln[(-Y(BP) + ((l/X)-Y^(l-BP^))^)/x"^ - Y) ) ] (4-2)
TB = -X""'^ln(l-BP) (4-3)
In these equations, Y is the force ratio (red/blue) , and BP
is the pre-set red force break point, BP is a value in the
permanent data base, and for the cases studied in Chapter V,
was taken to be 40% (i.e. the red force fought until it
reached the 40% survivor level) . X is the exchange ratio
defined by 4-1. Note that these equations are the same as
those defined in [1] for the homogeneous, fixed breakpoint
model, with the exception of the substitution of the exchange
ratio for the normally fixed attrition coefficients.
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2 . Interdicted Rate of Advance
The rate of advance for the succeeding and second
echelons of the red force are input by the user for each bat-
tle in a sequence. Interdiction (slowing) of this advance
rate is accomplished during each battle iteration through two
factors in the permanent data base which control the level of
interdiction. The amount of time available for recovery
operations is directly proportional to the speed at which the
next echelon can close with, rollup and begin attacking with,
the echelon in contact. Therefore, the level of interdiction
which the blue force can deliver is directly related to the
overall recovery time available. For all cases discussed in
Chapter V, the level of interdiction was allowed to vary sto-
chastically between and 50%. The interdiction factors in
the data base are used as the endpoints of a uniform distri-
bution, and the interdicted rate of advance is computed
according to the relation:
RI = R/I (4-4)
where R is the initial rate of advance (user input) , I is
the interdiction factor and RI is the interdicted rate of
advance. To pLay no interdiction, it is only necessary to
put a 1 into each of the permanent data base locations listed
in Annex C of Appendix A.
Note that RI is inserted into the peimaanent data base
and is used whenever the red advance rate is required in
36

subsequent computations. A new interdicted rate of advance
is not computed until module A is exercised again.
3. Travel Time to the Battle Site and MCP
Based on the user supplied cross country speed for
recovery vehicles, travel times are computed based on the dis-
tances to the battle site and the MCP which are input at this
stage of the program. Since cross country speed is in the
permanent data base, this figure can be manipulated to play
differing terrain. No red interdiction of recovery vehicle
speed is assumed for this model. The travel time of the re-
covery vehicles is an integral part of the equation for the
time available for recovery. In the cases discussed in Chap-
ter V, various cross country speeds were used to test the
overall impact of this parameter on the recovery operation.
The computation performed in this step is simply distance/
speed, where both are expressed in the same units of measure-
ment. Although only one cross country speed is designed in-
to the model, the small variations in capability among the
various recovery vehicles to cross country speed will have
little overall impact on the outcome, and so was not played.
4
.
Time Available for Recovery
For the purposes of this model, the time available
for recovery is called the critical time (TC) . The travel
times computed above as well as the RI value enter into the
computation of TC. PARET does not assume perfect informa-
tion flow between the forces in contact and the recovery
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crews. That is, the locations of disabled vehicles will not
be known with perfect certainty, and it is possible for the
recovery crews to get lost enroute to the battle site or the
MCP, especially at night. To allow for this contingency,
the permanent data base includes a disorientation factor (D)
which is entered as a percentage. If the value of D is any-
thing other than 0, that percentage of the total travel time
will be added to the computed travel time. D is automatically
increased when the transition to night operations is made.
Another use of the D factor might be to play smoke on the
battlefield, which would hinder recovery operations to some
degree.
Also in the permanent data base is a mean hook up time,
that is the mean time it should take a recovery vehicle to
rig a disabled vehicle for movement, barring any complica-
tions. This time was extracted from field trials discussed
in Ref. 3, and was held constant for the cases examined in
Chapter V. The mean hookup time is used as the mean of a
normal distribution of hookup times in the model. Both the
mean hookup time and the standard deviation for the distri-
bution of all hookup times are easily changed.
It was assum.ed that the red echelon in contact moves at
1 kmh. Further, the assumption was made that all battles take
place at a distance of 1 km. To change either of these param-
eters, a multiplicative factor must be introduced into the model
coding. As shown in Figure 2-1, the spacing between echelons
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of the red force were assumed to be 5 km. Echelon spacing is
a single line code entry in this subroutine (Annex B, Appendix
A).
Based on the foregoing distance and speed assumptions,
the next parameter to be considered is the time it takes for
the next echelon to rollup the echelon in contact and restart
the advance. During battle time, the lead element (the eche-
lon in contact) will move a distance equal to the time of bat-
tle (or nTB if some speed other than 1 kmh during contact is
assumed) . The follow-on echelon will close with the echelon
in contact at RI . When these two echelons finally join,
there will be a finite period of time during which the units
combine forces and begin to advance again. Stored in the per-
manent data base are two parameters which form the end points
of a uniform distribution representing this rollup and restart
time (TRR) . The cases of Chapter V used TRR bounds of 5 and
10 minutes. Combining all of these factors produces:
TRR =(spacing/RI) + TB + U(a,b) (4-5).
where TB is the battle time computed above and U(a,b) repre-
sents the uniformly distributed random variable with a = 5
and b = 10 for this case. Note that to make a different as-
sumption about the speed of the echelon in contact, it is
only necessary to insert the proper multiplicative factor ahead
of TB in 4-5.
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Simply stated, the time available for recovery Ccriti-
cal time) could be expressed as TB + TRR. However, this for-
mulation assumes that the recovery crews are notified as soon
as the first blue vehicle is disabled, and that the first blue
casualty occurs immediately at the start of TB . PARET does
not make those assumptions. The first blue casualty occurs
sometime between time and the time it takes to kill up to
the value of the exchange ratio (X) of red systems. For this
model, the assumption is made that the blue forces surprise
the red forces (i.e. the first casualty is red). Further, it
is assumed that there will be X red casualties (the value of
the exchange ratio) before the first blue casualty occurs.
This assumption is made to provide the largest correction fac-
tor for TC, thereby providing another worst case situation.
If it is assumed that the red casualties occur uniformly over
TB, then the following relation provides the necessary cor-
rection for TC:
C = -X(TB/red losses) (4-6)
where X is the exchange ratio and TB is the battle time. Note
that the uniform loss of red systems is a key consideration
in this correction factor. The factor, C, will be in the
same units as TB (hours in this model) . With this correction
factor, the time available for recovery can be stated as:
TC = TB + TRR + C (4-7)
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where TC is critical time, TRR is the time to rollup and re-
start, and TB is the battle time.
5. Number of Vehicles to be Recovered
In computing candidates for recovery, PARET does not
take into account random breakdowns or vehicles which have
become mired on the battlefield. There will be numerous main-
tenance failures as the length of the sequence of battles in-
creases, and weather conditions over a several day span could
surely cause many mired combat vehicles requiring recovery.
By decreasing the number of unrecoverable candidates and by
decreasing the amount of self/like recovery allowed, both of
these categories can be played in the model.
From the outset in the design of the model, the assump-
tion was made that there will be some percentage of the blue
casualties which will be unrecoverable, or not feasible to
recover due to the extent of the damage they received. The
permanent data base contains a factor for this number of un-
recoverables, expressed as a percentage of the total number
of candidates. For the test cases run, this percentage was
taken to be 10%.
Current recovery doctrine [3] specifies that the own-
ing unit has primary responsibilities for the recovery of its
own assets. The number of vehicles which can recover them-
selves, and those which are capable of being recovered by a
'like vehicle, substantially reduce the recovery requirement for
the recovery vehicles. In the permanent data base is the
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self/like recovery factor, which is expressed as a percentage
of the total number of casualties. The test cases in Chapter
V explore several levels of the self/like recovery percentage.
The relation for the number of vehicles which must be
recovered by the recovery vehicles is then:
NR = casualties - self/like % - unrecoverable % (4-8)
6. Red and Blue Force Survivors
Red and blue force survivors are computed through a
simple application of the red break point and the exchange
ratio. Red survivors are given by:
RT = BP(RO) (4-9)
where RT are the red survivors at time T, HP is the red break
point, and RO is the size of the initial red force. Using
this value, the blue survivors are:
BT = BO - (RO - RT)/X (4-10)
where BT is blue survivors at the time T, BO is the starting
blue force, RO is the starting red force, and X is the ex-
change ratio.
7. Expected Time to Recover the Casualties
The decision on which recovery technique to use is
based in part on the comparison of the expected time required
for recovery with the critical time. For example, if the
critical time (TC) is less than the time expected for recovery
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of all the casualties, some tradeoffs must be made by the
commander. Chapter VI discusses the decision factors used
in PARET in great detail.
The only user input parameter for this computation
is the number of recovery vehicles available to send on the
mission. Therefore, immediate sensitivity analysis of this
parameter is possible; this portion of the program could be
used, for example, to determine the expected number of re-
covery vehicles required to recover the entire force within
the TC parameter's range. In this computation, it is assumed
that no recovery vehicles are lost.
If it is assumed that all recovery vehicles arrive
at the disabled vehicles they are able to recover simultan-
eously, then it can be assumed that the hookup time computed
earlier is the hookup time for all of the vehicles to be re-
covered. This last assumption is not strictly valid since
the greatest hookup time for the entire group is the constrain-
ing variable; however, the hookup time is a normally distributed
random variable and over several battles in a given sequence,
the difference between this method and generating hookup times
for each vehicle to be recovered is beyond the resolution of the
model. Using these assumptions, the expected time of recovery
is given by:
TR = (2(NR/NA) - 1) (TTH + TH) + TT (4-11)
where TR is the expected time to recover the casualties, NR
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is t±ie number of disabled vehicles to be recovered, NA is
the number of recovery vehicles available to perform the mis-
sion, TTH is the travel time from the recovery site to the MCP
,
TH is the normally distributed hookup time, and TT is the travel
time from the recovery vehicle assembly area to the recovery
site. The first term of 4-11 determines how many trips must
be made by the recovery vehicles to recover all of the casual-
ties. Note that this formulation does not assume daisy chain-
ing will be used and does not assume any attrition of the
recovery vehicles. At the MCP, the recovery vehicles will
require a small amount of time to offload the disabled vehicles;
however, this time is so small in comparison to the other times
being considered that it was omitted from this formulation.
8. Expected Percentage of Recovery (no daisy chaining )
Current doctrine calls for daisy chaining whenever
possible in order to maximize the number of vehicles recovered
in a given amount of time. Intrinsic to the PARET model, how-
ever, is the assumption that the single most important param-
eter influencing the number of recovery vehicles lost on the
battle site is the time it takes them to actually hookup and
move away with a disabled vehicle in tow. Daisy chaining
will increase this time substantially, and therefore makes
the number of recovery vehicle losses much higher in this
model. The section describing the computation for probability
of kill on the recovery vehicles will describe the functional
relationship of the time parameters involved. For now, it is
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sufficient to note that daisy chaining is sometimes less than
desirable in the PARET context. Assuming no recovery vehicle
attrition, the expected percentage of recovery candidates re-
covered without daisy chaining is given by:
R = (TC/TR) (4-12)
where R is the expected percentage recovered, TC is the crit-
ical time, and TR is the expected time of recovery.
9 . Expected Percentage Recovery (with daisy chaining )
For this computation, equation 4-12 is again used
with the following modifying assumptions. When daisy chain-
ing is used, only two vehicles are allowed to be towed by
one recovery vehicle, the time to hookup the two vehicles is
exactly twice that for a single vehicle, and the travel time
to the MCP is 1.5 times as great as that when no daisy chain-
ing is used. To implmement these assumptions, TC is doubled,
as is TH; TTH is multiplied by 1.5. Doubling the value of
TC (critical time) has the same effect as being able to re-
cover twice as many vehicles in the same amount of time.
Doubling the numJDer of recovery vehicles available would have
the same effect as doubling TC.
At this point, the user has the two percentage of
recovery figures. If daisy chaining is elected based on
some decision rule (see Chapter VI) , a keyboard entry is made
and the changes mentioned above are made permanent for this




10. Expected Number of Recovery Vehicles Killed
During the recovery process, the recovery vehicles
are exposed to attrition three distinct times in the PARET
model. While moving from the assembly area to the battle
site, the assumption is made that the recovery vehicles will
be exposed to indirect fire only; i.e. no direct fire attri-
tion is allowed during this phase. On the battle site itself,
the recovery vehicles are assumed to be exposed to direct fire
attrition only. Then, during the movement to the MCP , only
indirect fire attrition is assumed.
The underlying assumption in the following formulation
for the probability of a hit (PH) on a recovery vehicle is
that PH is functionally related to the time of exposure of
the recovery vehicle to enemy fire. Further, the assumption
is made that on the battle sit itself, PH is a function of
time of exposure, and not of the proximity of the enemy firer's
Attrition modelling can be done using either the distance to
enemy relationship or the time of exposure relationship; for
passive targets such as recovery vehicles, the time relation-
ship has more intuitive appeal
.
For each of the movement phases in the attrition pro-
cess, two alternative methods of determining a probability of
hit were investigated. The first of these involved using a
Lanchester equation of the form [2]
:
L = EXP(-Qt) C4-13)
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where L is the total number of losses, Q is (-a/A) (V) (PK) (xy)
,
where a is the area presented by each recovery vehicle, A is
the total target area in which the recovery vehicle moves, V
is the red force rate of fire per hour, PK is the probability
of a kill given a hit, x and y refer to the size of the blue
and red forces respectively, and t is the time of exposure to
enemy fire. If it is assumed that the recovery vehicles move
in a rectangular area whose length is the distance to be trav-
elled and whose width is, for example 200 m, this formulation
produces a small number of casualties (less than 2 casualties
from a force of 8 recovery vehicles) . Even though this equa-
tion gives the number of losses during movement a direct
functional relationship with the time of exposure to enemy
fire, it kills recovery vehicles every time it is employed.
Given that the recovery vehicles are being exposed to unob-
served indirect fire during the movement phase, it is reason-
able to expect that attrition will not take place during each
movement. After trying many methods of expressing PK and
rates of fire to give intuitively appealing loss figures
using this model, another direction was taken which fulfills
the assumption that losses do not necessarily have to occur
during movement.
PARET uses a parametric computational form in deter-
mining the losses sustained during the movement phase. A
basic assumption is made that if a hit occurs, there will
necessarily be a kill; i.e. the probability of a kill given
47

a hit is 1. When vulnera,bility data on recovery vehicles be-
comes available, the model can be easily changed to compute
actual probabilities of kill given hits. For a recovery ve-
hicle, two kinds of kill are possible: mobility and catas-
trophic (m and k) . These kills are further subdivided by the
model into the level of maintenance required to effect repairs,
thereby allowing an expected time of return of the recovery
vehicle. The probability of kill on a recovery vehicle during
movement is given by;
PK = (tan(TE))^ (4-14)
where TE is the time of exposure for each recovery vehicle.
TE will be TT (travel time to the battle site) or TTH (travel
time to the MCP) depending on which leg of the movement the
vehicle is on. There are many functional forms which could
be used to provide a monotonically increasing value of PK as
TE increases . The tangent function was chosen because it
provides high values of PK when the time of exposure gets
large (greater than 1 hour for example) . Table 4-1 gives a
listing of some exposure times and the associated PK using
this relation. To determine if a kill is scored, a PK is
computed for each recovery vehicle sent on a mission; a
U(0,1) random number is drawn, and if the PK for that vehicle
is greater than the random number, a kill is tallied and the
number of recovery vehicles left alive is reduced appropriately
.
This routine is the longest running routine of the PARET model
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• since it computes a PK and a random number comparator for each
vehicle alive for each of the three phases mentioned above.
If 10 recovery vehicles are sent on a mission, several minutes









The probability of kill on the battle site requires the con-
sideration of more parameters than that for the movement
phases. Even though the basic assumption of PK being inde-
pendent from the distance to the enemy firers holds on the
battle site, many of the traditional parametric ideas from
the distance dependency formulation are useful here. In
PARET, the assumption is made that the red force has some
scheme of assigning target priorities, and that the red weapon
system will tend to fire first at targets which present ap-
parent danger to it, thereby assigning a lower priority to
passive targets such as recovery vehicles. A target priority,
then, can be thought of as having the effect of reducing the
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Xeffective time of exposure if the priority system in use
favors the passive targets. For this formulation, "bigger
is better," i.e. if a priority of 5 is assigned to a recovery
vehicle, that is better than having a priority of 1 assigned
to it. The cases considered in Chapter V use a target pri-
ority of 5 for the recovery vehicles. Priority is a value
stored in the permanent data base.
The attacker also has a finite probability of cor-
rectly identifying a target once it is acquired. Such things
as battlefield smoke, interdictory fires, or night operations
all degrade the red force's ability to correctly identify an
acquired target. For example, if the attacker identifies an
acquired target as a tank (which has a target priority of 1
on his target list) , but the target is in fact an M88 recovery
vehicle, the probability that the M88 will be killed is greatly
enhanced. In the context of exposure time, incorrect identi-
fication can be thought of as increasing the effective exposure
time of the recovery vehicle. The probability that an attacker
has line of sight on the targets before him also enters into
the consideration of identification. Another factor which
enters the formulation is blue supressive fire, which can be
thought of as having the effect of reducing the effective
time of exposure of recovery vehicles. For a recovery vehicle
on the battle site, the basic unit of exposure is the hookup
time. However, the assumptions just presented can be inter-
preted to mean that the "effective" exposure time, that is.
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some percentage of the actual time on the battle site during
which the recovery vehicle can be expected to be exposed to
enemy fire, can be expressed by:
TE = Lg(l - S) (Z) CP) (TH) (4-15)
where Lg is the probability that line of sight to recovery
vehicle exists, S is a random percentage of suppression from
the blue force, Z is the reciprocal of the target priority,
P is the probability of the red force incorrectly identifying
a recovery vehicle after acquisition, and TH is the hookup
time.
For example, if it is assumed that the acutal hookup
time is .5 hours, 'the probability that line of sight exists
is . 5, and if the red force is experiencing 90% suppression,
the priority of a recovery vehicle is 5, and the probability
of a recovery vehicle being incorrectly identified is .7,
then the value of TE would be .00 35 hours.
The probability of a kill (PK) is assumed to be some
function of this time of exposure. As in the case of the
movement phase, it is desired to have some functional rela-
tionship which causes PK to rise sharply as the time of ex-
posure increases. There are many functions which will fulfill
these requirements, as was pointed out in the explanation of
the PK during movement. PARET uses the following functional




PK = ABS(l/ln TE) (4-16)
where the absolute value is taken to yield a montonically in-
creasing function. To determine if a kill is scored, a random
comparator is drawn as was done for the movement phase. The
appropriate number of kills is tallied, and the number of re-
covery vehicles left alive are used for the movement phase from
the battle site to the MCP.
All of the parameters listed above are in the permanent
data base for flexibility in defining the conditions of a par-
ticular battle. For example, an increase in the probability
of line of sight could be used to play more open terrain,
while a decrease in the probability of incorrect identification
might be used to mean less reliance on infrared detection de-
vices by the red force. In Chapter V is a graphical display
of 9 2 times of exposure and their corresponding PK values
which were generated during one sequence of battles
.
11. Fix Forward
It has long been recognized that it is imperative to
repair as many combat damaged vehicles as possible on the
battle site in order to reduce the requirement for recovery
vehicles and to provide immediate turn-around of equipment
to the user. The CODAM Study [5] found that approximately
7% of all combat damaged tanks could be repaired in less than
two hours by organizational or direct support maintenance
personnel. For PARET, the assumption was made that this 7%
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rule could be generalized to all tracked vehicles. At any
time that TC (the time available for recovery) is greater
than or equal to 2 hours, 7% of the casualties are sub-
tracted from the recovery candidate total. It is obvious
that if TC is less than 2 hours some major repair might be
accomplished. However, it was felt that the contribution
to the reduction of the number of vehicles requiring recovery
when TC was under 2 hours would not be significant in this
study.
I' B. MODULE B
Module B performs the following functions which are de-
scribed in detail below:
a) computes expected number of vehicles recovered
b) computes the loss coefficient
c) computes the number of organizational and DS mobility,
firepower, and catastrophic kills (m, f, and k) by
type vehicle
d) computes current elapsed time
e) determines when day or night operations must be initiated
and makes appropriate parametric changes
1. Expected Niimber of Vehicles Recovered
This routine is used as a guide to determine the ex-
pected number of vehicles which could be recovered in the time
available. Recovery vehicle losses are not considered, nor
is the daisy chaining technique considered in the computation.
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The expected nuinber recovered is determined from:
NE = (TC/TR)NR (4-17)
where TC is the critical time, TR is the time required for
recovery, and NR is the number of recovery candidates. Use
of this routine is optional and was only included as a guide
during the collection of initial statistics. It may be de-
leted from the program with no effect to other portions of
the program.
2. Loss Coefficient
The loss coefficient is the ratio of the number of
recovery vehicles lost to the number of vehicles actually
recovered. During decision analysis, the loss coefficient
is useful as a measure of performance for planning recovery
missions. Module B will not be affected by the deletion of
this portion of the program,
3
.
Mobility, Firepower, and Catastrophic Kills
Module A generated a total number of vehicles requir-
ing recovery, but did not distinguish between tanks or TOWS,
nor did that module make any distinction as to the type of
kill the vehicle received.
As can be seen from the force structure used for the
development of the model, tanks make up approximately 40% of
the force while TOWs constitute the remaining 60%. These
numbers are in the code for this module, and can be changed
to suit any situation (see Annex B, Appendix A) . In combat
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modelling, it is common to classify vehicular kills as mobility,
firepower, or catastrophic. An additional classification, per-
sonnel kills, is used in some of the high resolution models,
but was not considered for this model since that category
generally has no effect on recovery requirements when consid-
ered alone. Mobility and firepower kills Cm and f) are
characterized by the vehicle being rendered immobile with
still functional fire control and armament systems, or by
the vehicle having no remaining armament but still mobile.
A catastrophic kill means that the vehicle suffered a combi-
nation m and f kill, usually indicating very severe damage.
For the PARET model, the CODAM report [5J was used
to provide approximate percentages of m, f, and k kills based
on data collected in the 1973 Israeli war. These percentages
are in the coding for this portion of the model, and may be
easily altered. The CODAM report also provided approximate
percentage breakpoints for the level of maintenance which
would be required for the recorded kills. Again, these per-
centages are in the coding for this portion of the module
.
As an aid for decision analysis, module B displays
the m, f, and k kills and the appropriate maintenance cate-
gories for all of the blue casualties, not just those which
were designated for recovery by the recovery vehicles. In-
formation on the total number of vehicles is necessary since
the decision for which vehicles to recover is generally based





After input of the appropriate number sig-
nifying desired output for tank or TOW (Appendix A) , organiza-




Since it was desired to model night operations into
the PARET model, it was necessary to monitor elapsed time
throughout each sequence of battles . PARET assumes that the
red echelon in contact will move forward at the rate of 1 kmh,
and that succeeding blue battle positions are 4 km apart (both
numbers can be changed through changes in the code) . During
the time of battle (TB) , the red echelon in contact will move
TB km. A further assumption is made that the level of blue
interdictory fires will remain constant during this phase,
i.e. the previously computed interdicted rate of advance
(HI) is still valid. With these assumptions, the elapsed
time is computed by summing the following equation during
each iteration of the model:
Time = TB + ((1-TB) + 4)/RI + TRR (4-18)
where TB is the time of battle, RI is the interdicted rate of
red advance, and TRR is the time for the red force to rollup
and restart. Note that elapsed time will not be computed if
module B is not used.
5. Night Operations
Many of the parameters used in PARET must be changed
when night operations are modelled. Such things as red rate
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of advance, recovery vehicle cross country speeds, mean hookup
time and the disorientation factor must be modified if night
operations are to be realistically modelled.
The assumption is made that there are no transition
periods from daylight to darkness and back again. At time
(elapsed) equal to 14 hours, the model immediately makes the
transition to night operations, and at time equal to 24 hours
daylight operations are again begun. Every 24 hours of elapsed
time causes 24 hours to be subtracted from current elapsed
time, so the user must be aware that the "clock" resets it-
self at the beginning of each "day" of combat. The 14 hour
point for the beginning of darkness is arbitrary; reference
to the coding of this portion of the program indicates the
changes to be made for any user defined hour for nightfall.
To simulate night operations, the following parameters are
internally modified at time equals 14 hours:
• the disorientation factor CD) is increased by 5%
• cross country speed for recovery vehicles is reduced by
50%
• the probability of line of sight is reduced to .1 (higher
reliance on IR)
the mean hookup time is increased by 50%
• the exchange ratio (X) is reduced by 50%
When elapsed time reaches 24 hours, the above parameters are
returned to their original values.
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It should be apparent that PARET makes daisy chain-
ing a difficult technique to attempt during night operations
due to the greatly increased exposure times for the recovery
vehicles. Chapter V draws some comparisons between day and
night operations in this area. Note that the rate of advance
for the red follow-on echelons is a user input parameter for
each iteration (battle) , and therefore must be manually modi-
fied during periods of night operations . For the cases high-
lighted in Chapter V, the red rate of advance was reduced by
50% during night operations.
C. MODULE C
This module performs the following functions which are
explained in detail below:
a) computes the expected time of return for those kills
developed in module B
b) computes the number of recovery vehicles requiring
either organizational or general support maintenance
c) computes how many recovery vehicles will be operationally
ready to begin the next battle
1. Expected Time of Return
From the CODAM data base, the expected times of re-
turn of combat vehicles from the appropriate maintenance
level based on type kill were extracted and entered into
the program coding. Based on kill distribution computed in
module B, the CODAM percentages were used as the means of
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normal distributions of return times, with various standard
deviations based on the maintenance level being considered.
If the printer is used with the calculator, expected return
times are automatically printed for each vehicle individually;
otherwise, a mean time of return is displayed for each cate-
gory of maintenance. To obtain the mean time of replacements
for the blue force, this time is added to the elapsed time
previously computed (manual computation)
.
For the kill distribution, mean return times are
generated for all of the blue casualties. Chapter VI points
out how this expected return time is one of the primary de-
cision factors which influences which of the casualties will
be recovered.
2 . Recovery Vehicle Maintenance Distribution
In general, tracked recovery vehicles are allocated
very little authorized maintenance at the DS level. As a
result, PARET determines only organizational and GS recovery
vehicle maintenance requirements. The assumption was made
that approximately 30% of all recovery vehicle casualties
will be repaired at the organizational level. Using a Monte
Carlo approach, this routine determines how many of the re-
covery vehicle casualties fall into the organizational mainte-
nance category, and that number is displayed as output.
Since total number of recovery vehicles requiring
organizational maintenance is displayed without regard to
type vehicle, a random number draw technique is used to
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determine the type vehicles in the organizational and GS
maintenance categories. This random number comparison is a
manual computation; another example of sacrificing a "nice
to have" routine in order to conserve available memory space.
3. Operational Availability of Recovery Vehicles
It was decided to use actual operational readiness
data on recovery vehicles for this study rather than proving
ground data. Actual data does not provide a true picture of
what would be expected in combat, but does reflect some of
the performance profiles for these vehicles under conditions
of hard usage. The MiMC of the 13th COSCOM, Fort Hood, Texas,
provided a compilation of one year's data collected from two
armored divisions on the operational availability of the re-
covery vehicles used in this study.
The user inputs the number of recovery vehicles, by
type, which are currently "alive," and the number of vehicles
which will be "up" for the next battle is displayed. Based
on the number of recovery vehicles which are operationally
available for the next battle, decisions have to be made re-
garding the percentage of self/like recoveries required,
whether or not to request the maintenance company M88, or
whether recovery will be limited to only certain casualties,
i.e. recover only tanks at the expense of TOW recoveries.
Chapter VI discusses this problem in detail.
PARET does not directly generate return times from
maintenance for the recovery vehicles; rather, it is assumed
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that organizational failures will be returned in 20 hours
and GS failures will be returned to the unit in 90 hours.
Upon return from maintenance, a recovery vehicle is assumed
to be in an "up" condition for that iteration. No random
maintenance failures of recovery vehicles are played in
PARET.
D. MODULE D
Module D forecasts the number of heavy equipment trans-
porters (HET's) which are required in the brigade based on
kill distribution developed in module B and the number of
vehicles actually recovered. Two computations are performed
in this routine: total HET forecast for this battle, and
expected return time of the HET's from GS maintenance. No
enemy interdiction along the main supply route (MSR) was
assumed, and no random maintenance failures were played.
Operational availability of the HET's was modelled implicitly
into the routine, as explained below.
1. HET Forecast
Note that the basic assumption of this routine is
that the number of HET's now organic to a brigade (2) is
inadequate. Rather than model the performance of existing
assets, PARET determines how many HET's would be required
to adequately support the brigade given the kill distribution
developed previously. As Chapter V points out, the HET fore-
cast is driven by the red succeeding echelon rate of advance.
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since each transporter will be required to carry
tanks, T0^7's, and at least two types of recovery vehicles,
a quantity known as a "HET equivalent" was developed for
computational simplicity. HET equivalents for PARET are dis-
played below. Module C and module B casualties are easily
divided among tanks and TOW s by using the relative percen-
tages of these vehicles making up the blue force. For PARET,
tanks make up 40% of the force, TOW s 60%. The recovery ve-
hicle loss distribution was computed in module C also. Note
that the table below lists an II578 as being one HET equiva-
lent, while in reality it is h HET equivalent. By so doing,








Rather than track the exact distance from the MCP
to the DS and GS maintenance companies, it was assumed that
the DS company would be located 35 km from the FEBA, and
would move when the FEBA was within 15 km of its position.
Similarly, the GS company was assumed to be located 100 km
from the FEBA, and would move when the FEBA was within 50 km
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of its position. From [3J , a mean time to load a HET was
determined, and it was assumed that the offload time would be
half of that figure. To account for uneven terrain, the HET
road speed was assumed to be 60 kmh unloaded, and 30 kmh
loaded. Since the critical time (TC) is the controlling param-
eter for evacuation operations, the maximum number of trips
which can be made to the DS maintenance unit is given by:
MD = (TC - TTH)/B (4-18)
where TC is the critical time as computed in module A, TTH is
the time of travel from the battle site to the MCP, and B is
given by
:
B = TL + TU + DDS/VU + DDS/VL (4-19)
Here, TL is the load time, TU is the offload time, DDS is the
mean distance to the DS unit, VU is the unloaded speed of the
HET, and VL is the loaded speed. If Q is taken to be the HET
equivalents going to the direct support unit, then the minimum
number of HET's required to evacuate all eligible vehicles to
the DS unit is given by:
Hmin = Q/MD (4-20)
where MD is defined as above.
Due to the travel time involved in moving to the GS
unit, it was assumed for this model that only one lift could
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be made to the general support unit, i.e. there must be enough
HET's to carry all GS evacuation candidates to the GS unit in
one lift from the MCP . It is further assumed that the elements
of the direct support unit located at the MCP will perform the
necessary inspection of damaged equipment, and that they can
process a job directly to the GS unit. If this assumption is
not played, the number of HET's required for GS evacuation can
be subtracted from the overall forecast since all evacuations
will then be made from the DS unit. When the GS HET require-
ment is considered, the forecast for HET's becomes:
HMIN = QG - Ilmin (4-21)
where QG is the number of HET equivalents for GS maintenance.
Equation 4-21 only holds when QG is greater than Hmin. When
this condition is not met, Hmin is taken to be the HET fore-
cast for this battle. PARET produces this forecast indepen-
dently for each battle. Manual tracking of the HET forecast
is required for each battle to determine how many HET's are
now on hand versus the number needed from the forecast. When
the forecast exceeds the number already on hand, the differ-
ence between the two is added to the number on hand. At the
end of a complete sequence of battles, the total number of





2. HET Return Time
Since the assiiinption was made that enough HET's would
be forecast to completely evacxiate all casualties to DS and
GS maintenance units, and that one lift would be required for
GS evacuation, it is only necessary to compute the expected
time of return from the GS unit in order to be able to pre-
dict how many HET's are on hand at any time. Using a rela-
tion similar to 4-19, the time for one complete trip to the
GS unit is given by:
C = TL + TU + DS/VL + DGS/VU (4-22)
where TL, TU, VL and VU are as given for 4-19, and DGS is the
distance from the MCP to the GS maintenance unit. This time
is manually added to the elapsed time to determine the "clock"
time for the return of the HET's to the unit. As Chapter V
points out, the degree of agreement between the results ob-
tained using this forecasting method and the results obtained
from the Battlefield Recovery Study [3] is remarkably close.
The HET forecast developed in this routine is the
forecast for the entire number of expected recoveries; self
and like recoveries were also considered to have input to the
requirements for HET's. To model the recoveries other than
those performed by the recovery vehicles, it was assumed that
the beginning percentage of self/like recoveries would sustain
approximately the same loss rate as the recovery vehicles
(even though that was not explicitly addressed in this analysis)
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and that the distribution for the various levels of mainte-
nance required would be the same. Then, if N = (l-%self/like)
,
the actual values of Q and QG used in the equations above were
obtained from:
QG = number of GS casualties/N (4-23)
and
Q = number of DS casualties/N (4-24)
where the casualties in each case were derived from a con-
sideration of the expected number of self/like recoveries and






In order to exercise the PARET model, five "cases" were
constructed in which various parametric changes were made
to investigate their impact on the recovery and evacuation
processes. Five replications of each case were made, and
the data presented in this chapter represents the mean out-
put, unless othervise noted.
The interpretation of the data presented must be made in
the light of the specific assumptions used to construct each
subroutine, the parameters used for the individual cases, and
the tactical scenario used for the model. Small changes in
certain key parameters will cause considerable variation in
the results obtained.
Portrayed in the graphs and tables which follow are those
outputs which seemed most important to analyze for the battle
variations considered. A great deal of data was collected
during the replications of PARET, but because no clear rela-
tionships suggested themselves in that data, it was discarded
B. CASES CONSIDERED
Listed below are the permanent data base entries used to
control the assumptions for the five cases previously men-
tioned. Appendix A, Annex C gives the detailed listing of
the PARET data base locations. All data entered into the
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permanent data base (pdb) will remain intact until changed by
the user, and the factors listed below for each case must be
entered before the first battle of any sequence is fought.
As noted in Chapter III, the blue forces move to a new bat-
tle position each time the red force reaches its break point,
unless otherwise noted.
1. Case 1
Red forces rate of advance: 8 kmh (day), 5 kmh (night)
% self/like recovery: 0%
Distance from recovery vehicle assembly area to battle
site: 2 km
Distance to MCP : 15 km
Red breakpoint (% of survivors) : 40%
% vehicles unrecoverable: 10%
Allowable blue interdiction of red advance: to 50%
Disorientation factor: 5%
Probability of line of sight: .3
Target priority of recovery vehicles: 5
Vehicle inspection performed at the MCP
Battle site spacing; 4 km
Hookup time distribution: Normal (30 min, 10 min)
Recovery Vehicle cross country speed: 10 kmh
No specific rule for the use of daisy chaining (crew
discretion)
2. Case 2




Red rate of advance: 3 kmh (day), 2 kmh (night)
% self/like recovery: 40%
Distance to battle site: 1 km
Disorientation factor: 0%
Probability of line of sight: .9
Recovery vehicle cross country speed: 15 kmh
Distance to MCP: 10 km
3. Case 3
All parameters from case 2 are the same except the
following:
Red rate of advance: 8 kmh
Distance to MCP: 15 km




Case 4 is identical to case 2, except daisy chaining
was allowed only when the expected percentage of recoveries
without daisy chaining was less than 85%. Also, red force
strength (in contact) was kept continually greater than 200
by allowing more red replacements for each battle. In the
three cases above, red in-contact strength was kept below 200
for each battle.
5. Case 5
This case is identical to case 4 except daisy chain-
ing was allowed only when the expected percentage of recoveries
using daisy chaining exceeded that without daisy chaining by
20%. Further, the blue force (each battalion team) was required
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to stand and fight on its battle position until its strength
reached 50% of the original strength. When this breakpoint
was reached, that team withdrew to the battle position of the
other battalion team, and the combined force stood and fought
until it reached the 50% breakpoint. At that point, the prob-
lem was ended.
C. RATIONALE
The cases considered for this study represent a wide range
of possible parameters for both the blue and the red forces.
Those factors which seemed to have the most effect on the
outcome of the amount of recovery and evacuation which could
be performed were those which were varied.
Case 1 represents a worst case for recovery and evacua-
tion since the red rate of advance is the fastest in this
case. The MCP is relatively far from the battle site, dis-
orientation for the recovery crews is allowed, and there is
no self/like recovery allowed for this case. Additionally,
the recovery vehicle cross country speed is relatively slow.
Daisy chaining is left up to the crew's discretion in cases
1 and 2 in order to investigate the differences in performance
which occur when some quantitative decision rule for daisy
chaining is employed, as in cases 4 and 5.
In case 2, some of the restrictions of case 1 are relaxed,
the red rate of advance is slowed, and self/like recovery is
played. Both the distance to the battle site and to the MCP
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are shortened to investigate the criticality of the travel
time to these locations. Based on parametric inputs / case 2
is the "best" case for recovery and evacuation. Note the re-
lationship between the probability of line of sight and the
probability of correctly acquiring the target (correct identi-
fication after acquisition) . With the probability of line of
sight set at .9, the assumption is being made that there is
no smoke on the battlefield, and that the red force will de-
pend on visual identification rather than infra-red identifi-
cation. The use of visual identification will keep the
adjusted time of exposure short, and therefore, recovery ve-
hicle survivability high.
Case 3 increased the red rate of advance, moved the MCP
farther from the battle site and forbade the use of daisy
chaining. Direct comparisons with case 1 are possible, bear-
ing in mind the other parametric changes carried forward from
case 2.
Cases 4 and 5 are similar in that they both play quanti-
tative rules for the decision to use daisy chaining during
recovery. A slow red rate of advance is used, and the MCP
is relatively close to the battle site. The primary area to
be investigated in these two cases is the effect of intro-
ducing some decision logic on the recovery tactics. Also
note that the red force level is kept at a higher level than
in the previous cases- in order to generate more blue casualties
and produce a longer time of battle. Case 5 investigates what
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the effect of changing the blue combat tactic is on the re-
covery and evacuation effort.
All possible variations of the parameters in the model
have not been investigated for this study. Rather, those
which seemed significant were allowed to change. The worst
and best cases of those listed above provide some striking
contrasts in the measures of performance for recovery and
evacuation to be discussed below.
D. ANALYSIS
Figure 5-1 displays a set of data collected from one run
of case 1. The graph shows the effect of increasing time of
exposure relative to the probability of being killed. Note
that this probability of kill is that for the battle site
computation, based on the methodology prese.nted in Chapter
IV. Case 1 used a probability of line of sight of .3 which
slightly inflates the time of exposure, hence the PK for case
1 will be slightly higher, on the average, than that for case
2. The general shape of the PK curves for all cases will be
the same
.
Figure 5-1 was generated from 92 data points. It is sig-
nificant that the PK was less than .33 in 71% of the cases
presented here. FM 71-100, Armored and Mechanized Division
Operations, presents a probability of first round kill chart
(page 2-9) for the SAGGER v/eapons system firing at M-60 tanks
At 1 km, the SAGGER has a probability of first round kill on
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EXPOSURE TIME VERSUS PROBABILITY OF KILL
K




an M-60 in hull defilade of .28. Since the recovery vehicles
will be operating behind the weapon systems they are retriev-
ing, it seems reasonable to assume that the presented target
area of the recovery vehicle should be not greater than a tank
in hull defilade. PARET, then, agrees remarkably well with
established doctrine for the probabilties of kill for recovery
vehicles on the battle site under the modelling assumptions
used.
PARET automtatically keeps track of total elapsed time
during its execution, and battle time is displayed during
each iteration and so can be manually tabulated. From this
data it is possible to determine an approximate conversion
factor from battle time to elapsed time for use in analyzing
other models. Since red divisions were assumed to have the
same spacing as the regiments in the cases investigated, in
order to express elapsed time based on a more realistic di-
visional spacing it was necessary to assume that the red
divisions were separated by 20 km. Using a mean interdicted
rate of advance, and by determining how many red divisions
would have been engaged in a particular sequence of battles,
an "adjusted" elapsed time was computed. The total distance
moved across the battlefield was also tallied, and so an
actual red rate of advance for any sequence of battles is
easily computed. Table 5-1 displays data from several cases
which compares the blue tactic, red rates of advance and
elapsed times. For this discussion, tactic 1 is the bounding
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retrograde tactic which causes the blue force to displace to
an alternate battle position each time the red force reaches
its break point. Tactic 2 requires the blue force to stand
and fight until it reaches 50% of its original force, then it
withdraws to the battle position of the other battalion team.
TACTIC RA ELAPSED TIME ADJ TliXIE ACTUAL RA ADJ RA
1 8 kmh 28.3 39.6 1.41 kmh 1.01 kmh
1 3 76.8 116.8 .573 .377
2 3 42.7 72.7 .562 .330
TABLE 5-1
The use of tactic 1 allowed the red forces to move a mean
distance of 4 2 km during the sequence of battles, while the
use of tactic 2 allowed the reds to move only 24 km on the
average. These distances were used to derive the actual and
adjusted rates of advance listed above. For the 8 kmh rate
of advance cases, the blue tactic used is immaterial since
little recovery can be performed due to the rapid movement of
the FEBA produced by red momentum. If the red rate of ad-
vance can be held to a low value through interdictory fires,
the blue force can be expected to hold out reasonably long
based on the assumptions used for the model. Reference 3
states that the blue forces can fight a delaying action for
approximately four days if the red rate of advance is .5 kmh.
PARET shows very good agreement with those numbers.
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In Table 5-2, the mean number of recovery vehicle losses
by type are displayed for each of the cases. Recall that
cases 1 and 3 portrayed an 8 kmh rate of advance for the red
succeeding echelons, and a distance of 15 km to the MCP. The
table displays total losses by type; during the exercise of
the model, statistics were collected on the percentage of
losses during movement versus those lost on the battle site
during the actual recovery. Of all recovery vehicle losses,
70% occurred on the battle site itself (direct fire attrition)
.
A 30% loss rate due to indirect fire is high, but only because
PARET assumes a hit is identical to a kill. When vulnerability
data for direct and indirect fire becomes available, PARET
can be modified to reflect the change, and the percentage of
all kills should shift more significantly toward the direct
fire attrition. Other forms of interdiction of the recovery
vehicles during movement can be played by using a stochastic
modification in the routine which controls the probability
of kill during movement.
Chapter VI details the decision factors used for the
allocation of the recovery vehicles to specific missions.
That decision process included not committing the M553 ve-
hicles until all, or nearly all, of the M578 vehicles were
inoperative or dead; the M553 loss rate is correspondingly
low in Table 5-2 for that reason. It was assumed that each
battalion team had 7 MSB's, 4 M578's and 4 M553's at the
beginning of any sequence of battles. The aggregated loss
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rates depicted in the table reflect multiple losses, i.e. some
of the recovery vehicles which were returned from maintenance
were killed again (cases 1, 2 and 3). A high resolution model
could keep track of recovery vehicles by bumper numbers, thus
providing more detailed output reflecting which vehicles actu-
ally received multiple kills.
TOTAL RECOVERY VEHICLE LOSSES (BY TYPE)
CASE M88 M578 M553
1 17 8 3
2 13 12 2
3 15 7 2




All models now in use quantify the response of the vari-
able under study through the use of some measure of perform-
ance (MOP) . A natural MOP for a model which investigates
recovery and evacuation is the number of vehicles actually
recovered versus those vehicles which were recovery candi-
dates. The number of vehicles actually recovered is deter-
mined based on the number of recovery vehicles sent on the
mission, how many were killed, and whether or not daisy
chaining was being used for the mission. Table 5-3 shows
the number of tanks and TOW s which were recovered by
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recovery vehicles versus how many were candidates for recovery
as determined by the model. The data reflects the intuitive
result that the red rate of advance is the controlling param-
eter for recovery operations, at least in a formulation which
does not play random maintenance failures of the recovery ve-
hicles. In those cases where the probability of line of sight
was high, or when the distance to the MCP was relatively short,
the percentage of recovery was higher overall. This data
agrees well with that found in Reference 3.
It is interesting to note that the highest percentage of
recovery occurred when the fixed percentage rule (case 4) was
enforced. Case 1 allowed daisy chaining at the discretion of
the crew, and the red advance rate was 8 kmh; by contrast,
case 3 forbade daisy chaining at the same rate of advance,
and the percentage of recovery more than doubled. Although
this outcome seems to indicate that the recovery tactic used
is also directly related to the red rate of advance, more
replications of each of these specific cases would be needed
to confirm these results. Case 5 employed decision criteria
centering around a difference in expected percentages of re-
covery using both methods; this logic does not seem quite as
reliable as that used for case 4, but recall that the blue
force's tactics were also modified for case 5. Chapter VI
enumerates the recovery priority system used in the model,





NUMBER RECOVERED VERSUS NUMBER OF CANDIDATES
CASE TANK % TOW %
1 13/82 16 6/123 5
2 36/53 68 19/75 25
3 19/50 38 15/73 21




Case 1 losses appear higher in the table because the per-
centage of self/like recovery was set a 0. The distribution
of recovery vehicle losses by type also influences what the
actual mix of recoveries will be; i.e. an M88 can recover
anything on the battlefield, but the M578/M553 vehicles are
limited to the lighter vehicles.
The number of vehicles returned to the user during a se-
quence of battles is totally dependent on the elapsed time
achieved during the sequence. Elapsed time is a function of
the tactics being employed, the effectiveness of the recovery
effort, and the red rate of advance. Table 5-4 depicts the
mean number of vehicles of all types returned to the user
before termination of the sequence of battles. Case 2 pro-
duced the highest number of returnees to combat, and this
was an intuitive result since case 2 was the best case by
design. Even though case 4 had the best recovery percentage
of all the cases, the number of vehicles returning to combat
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is low because in this case and in case 5, the red force was
kept at a higher level for each engagement than for the other
cases. This higher red force level caused elapsed time of the
sequences to be shorter since the blue force was brought to
its break point in a much faster time. Note also that the 8
kmh rate of advance has nearly the same effect on the number
of vehicles returning (cases 1 and 3) as increasing the size
of the opposing force. Due to the underlying Lanchester basis
of PARET, elapsed time is shortened by either increasing the
opposing force or by increasing their rate of advance. Recall
that it was assumed that the basic red force tactic centered
around momentum, and momentum has only two components: mass
and speed.
NUMBER OF VEHICLES RETURNED TO BATTLE
CASE M88 M578 M553 TANK TOW TOTAL
1 4 Q 8 4 16
2 4 6 20 15 45
3 2 2 7 6 17




One of the most troublesome areas in the interpretation
of output from a model is the relation of battle time (time
in combat) to elapsed time, or "clock" time. Using the
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adjusted time data produced in Table 5-1, Figure 5-2 shows
the relationship between battle time and elapsed time. Data
for tactics 1 and 2, and for the 3 and 8 kmh rates of advance
are shown.
Chapter IV discussed the rationale used in forecasting
the number of HET's required for a combat brigade involved
in a delaying action. Reference 3 determined that the bri-
gade would require 7 HET's to perform evacuation to the
various levels of maintenance. Table 5-5 shows the results
of the PARET forecasting routine for determining the HET
requirement. The number of HET's required is more directly
dependent on the rate of advance of the red force than on
any other single parameter. This result is intuitively appeal-
ing since less recovery can be performed when the opposing
force is approaching at a higher apparent speed.








If it can be assumed that the red force will move at 3
kmh, then the 7 HET's determined to be required by Ref. 3
appears to be a reasonable estimate.
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As was mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, many
more statistics were collected during the many runs of each
of the cases presented here. Most, however, were used to
gain insight into how the model worked and how the various
parameters are inter-related in the recovery and evacuation
process. An effort was made to distill the insight gained
from using the model into one concise group of data repre-
sentative of most of the key issues facing the logistics





This chapter investigates the parameters used for decision
making in the PARET model. The combat processes leading up
to the recovery and evacuation processes have been modelled
simply; red and blue forces stand and fight until one or the
other reaches some pre-determined breakpoint. In a general
sense, that breakpoint represents the point at which the unit
ceases to be an effective fighting force, based on some sub-
jective decision process the modeller has used. A combat
unit does not reach a state of ineffectiveness instantaneously
as the model presupposes; the commander on the ground must go
through a great deal of analysis of various factors before he
reaches the decision that his unit no longer can be called
upon to effectively counter the enemy.
Just as the basic decision on combat effectiveness can
be modelled through a quantitative factor, so too some of
the decision processes involved in the recovery and evacua-
tion of combat vehicles can be modelled easily. One of the
primary uses of the PARET model is the investigation of the
decision factors leading to successful recovery, evacuation
of the damaged equipment, and eventual return of the equip-
ment to the user. This chapter highlights what decision rules
were used in the cases discussed in Chapter V.
For simplicity, it was assumed that no recovery missions
would be rejected. In actuality, missions would be rejected
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for factors such as too great a perceived threat, no recovery
vehicle crews, or the number of operational recovery vehicles
being below some pre-set level. These factors are easily
modelled in a high resolution model, and will not be dwelt
upon here.
The decision process used in PARET is described below.
All of the factors influencing the decision to recover or not
to recover would take a great deal of time to fully uncover
and model; those listed here are considered to be those which
must be dealt with first, i.e. those which constitute the
"heart" of the recovery and evacuation decision process. For
clarity, the factors to be discussed are introduced in the
form of a series of questions.
A. IS THERE ENOUGH TIME TO RECOVER THE ENTIRE GROUP OF
RECOVERY CANDIDATES?
Comparison of the expected time to recover the force and
the time available for recovery (critical time) must be made.
If self/like recovery is being used, it may be necessary to
raise the percentage of vehicles recovered in this manner if
time is the over-riding constraint on the system. In the
event that self/like recovery is infeasible or cannot be in-
creased, a decision must be made on the number of vehicles
which will be recovered. It is also possible that the imple-
mentation of the daisy chaining technique will allow all, or
almost all of, the candidates to be recovered. For the cases
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considered in Chapter V, the percentage of self/like recovery
was held constant, and daisy chaining was only used when cer-
tain percentage criteria were met (in the cases which imposed
rules on recovery tactics) . Decision logic to vary the per-
centage of self/like recovery, or to impose daisy chaining
based on some time ratio parameter is easy to incorporate in
a model in order to optimize the percentage of vehicles
recovered.
B. WHAT IS THE PRIORITY FOR THE RECOVERY OF VEHICLES?
The PARET model lists kills by their category of mainte-
nance and the type kill. Additionally, the expected time of
return from maintenance is an output parameter. For all
cases considered, the following priority for recovery was
assigned to vehicles: tanks, M88's, TOW's, M578's, M553's.
The vehicles with the shortest expected turn around time from
maintenance were those recovered in each category, dependant
on what recovery vehicles were available to use. Such a sub-
jective prioritization is mandatory in order that the time
available for recovery can be optimized. It has been implicitly
assumed that at least enough information from the vehicle crews
will be made available to the recovery teams so that some idea
of the extent of damage will be available before the recovery
mission is launched. This will probably not be the case; the
recovery crews will have to make an evaluation of the extent
of the damage at the battle site, and recover those vehicles
which fit the priority scheme.
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Due to the time-based nature of this model, it is assumed
that initial vehicle inspection will be performed at the MCP,
not the battle site. Again, perfect information flow is being
implicitly assumed. Incorporation of the "7% rule" makes the
prospect of less-than-perfect information flow easier to cope
with since it can be assumed that the organizational mainte-
nance personnel on the battle site will have performed at
least a cursory inspection of the damaged equipment, and can
therefore provide the recovery crews with a representative
idea of which vehicles are the most likely recovery candidates
C. HOW MANY RECOVERY VEHICLES SHOULD BE SENT FORWARD?
If the mission is not refused, there are three alterna-
tive answers for this question: send one recovery vehicle
for each damaged vehicle, send all available recovery vehicles
on every mission, send recovery vehicles up to some pre-
determined "safety level."
Alternatives one and three are easily incorporated into
a model. PARET used alternative two whenever possible. In
a high resolution model, it might be desirable to allow the
shifting of recovery assets so that the unit in contact has
only operational recovery vehicles at its disposal. PARET
played no cross-leveling of assets but did allow the unit in
contact to request the M88 from the maintenance company at-
tached to the brigade. Unless lost in combat, that additional
M88 was assumed to be always "up," and no time was assessed
to move it up to the battle site.
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D. VVHEN SHOULD DAISY CHAINING BE EMPLOYED?
In a model which does not use exposure time for the param-
eter used for determining the probability of kill, daisy chain-
ing does not impose as serious a penalty as in the PARET model.
Cases were studied in Chapter V which allowed the crew to de-
cide to use daisy chaining at their discretion, and some cases
in which quantitative rules were imposed before daisy chaining
would be allowed.
From the analysis presented in Chapter V, it appears that
the use of some expected percentage of recovery for the decision
rule is the more viable rule. When exposure time is not being
considered, the decision rule should center around a compari-
son of the time available for recovery versus the time neces-
sary to daisy chain, all, or part of, the recovery candidates
off the battle site. Current doctrine requires daisy chaining
whenever possible; the interpretation of "possible" is the
decision rule to be modelled in the context of the individual
model ' s parameters
.
E. HOW SHOULD CREW AVAILABILITY BE MODELLED?
For the purpose of simplicity, PARET assumes total crew
availability for the recovery vehicles. In the case of the
high resolution model, the percentage of a crew lost when a
recovery vehicle sustains a kill must be specified. Continu-
ous operations must be modelled in such a way that crew availa-
bility will be degraded over time in much the same way as
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combat effectiveness is lost in the fighting unit. The combi-
nation of attrition and constant operations can be assumed to
render a large part of the remaining recovery fleet inoperable
after only a few days of combat.
Through the same reasoning, the performance of the mainte-
nance elements will degrade over time. This phenomena can be
easily modelled through an inflation of the expected turn
around time from maintenance for each succeeding day of com-
bat. Similarly, lengthening of the expected times for recov-
ery can be used to model the decreasing effectiveness of the
recovery crews
.
F. HOW MUCH OF THE RECOVERY FORCE SHOULD BE ALLOCATED FOR
CONTINGENCY MISSIONS?
One of the contingency missions which will affect the
availability of the recovery assets will be the need for a
heavy lift capability at the MCP. Requests may be received
for the recovery of allied equipment in other sectors of the
battlefield, or for the recovery of higher priority equipment
in the division.
To the author's knowledge, no high resolution models exist
which play logistic activities to this level of resolution.
The "safety" level of recovery vehicles referred to previously
could be used to provide support for these contingency mis-
sions. A set of rules that allocate recovery vehicles to mis-
sions other than recovery of damaged equipment would require
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a great deal of subjectivity on the part of the modeller, and
would necessarily have to be flexible enough to allow easy
change of the parameters.
This chapter has not covered all of the decision factors
which must enter into the complex area of recovery and evacu-
ation. Those which have been presented, however, form the
basis of what is essential as a solid base from which embel-
lishments can be made to enhance the performance of the model.
Careful, step-wise development of logistics models will eventu-
ally provide the same level of detail for the combat subfunc-
tions as the pure combat models have achieved.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has presented an analytical approach to model-
ling one of the combat subfunctions . Rather than using the
traditional approach of using a large, computer based simula-
tion, a parametric model for use in the hand-held calculator
was developed.
Battlefield recovery encompasses the retrieval of combat
damaged vehicles, and also those which become random mainte-
nance casualties, or those which become mired on the battle-
field. Only the first case of vehicles was considered in the
model; the inclusion of the other classes of recovery candi-
dates into the model could be easily accomplished. If the
activities surrounding the act of recovery are understood,
breakdowns and mired vehicles become an extension of the basic
process.
PARET was developed to be played in a defensive environ-
ment in order to model the maximum amount of stress on the
underlying logistics system. By allowing the red force to
be virtually unlimited in size, it was possible to study the
blue recovery and evacuation tactics in great detail when
system capabilties were stressed to the breaking point. All
cases discussed in Chapter V proved that recovery can be ac-
complished in a relatively timely manner, given that the
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basic model assumptions are correct and reasonably represent
the "real" world.
Analysis of the effects of the red succeeding echelon
rates of advance indicates that not only is the recovery ef-
fort controlled by that parameter, but also the location of
the MCP and combat trains must be carefully considered in the
light of the expected red rate of advance. When the red rate
of advance is between 5 and 8 kmh, the MCP must be at least
15 km from the FEBA to preclude being over-run. Slower rates
of advance would allow closer proximity for the MCP. The
maintenance units are not as sensitive to the rate of advance,
but care must be taken to insure that their placement allows
2 to 3 days of uninterrupted support before they have to dis-
place. At the faster rates of advance, the DS maintenance
unit should be located 40 to 50 km from the FEBA, based on
the PARET model. Support from the maintenance units is in
direct proportion to their stability; more displacements to
avoid the enemy will result in lower levels of support, which
in turn will cause the blue force to reach its breakpoint
sooner.
Although PARET did not forecast the number of recovery
vehicles required for the brigade as was done for the HET's,
the recovery rate at the higher rates of advance indicates
that additional recovery vehicles is the only alternative to
implement to achieve higher recovery rates in the same time.
There will be a point of marginal returns in increasing the
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the number of recovery vehicles on the battlefield due to the
increased level of confusion caused by any substantial increase
in numbers.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are made: a) that follow-
on research be conducted to model the maintenance subfunction,
from the MCP to the supporting maintenance unit, and back to
the user; b) that recovery and evacuation be included in exist-
ing high resolution combat models; and c) that strong con-
sideration be given to the development of a logistics "library"
module for the hand-held calculator. Such modules are capable
of storing 5000 program steps, and would obviate the .need for
using the magnetic card system for models like PARET. The
United States Army Field Artillery School has had a module
constructed for them by Texas Instruments for the TI-59.
That module is used in the fire control area exclusively, but
lends credence to the feasibility of the hand-held calculator
as an analytical tool for field use.
It is hoped that the methodology used for the PARET model
has provided an investigative tool for the battlefield re-
covery and evacuation studies which are now being conducted,
and for those to be conducted in the future.
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APPENDIX A: USER'S MANUAL
This appendix is arranged in three annexes which cover the
following material: Annex 1: use of the model, Annex 2: pro-
gram listing, and Annex 3: data base listing.
In its present form, PARET is contained on five pro-
gram cards and one data card. It is possible to compress
the model onto fewer cards once its operation is fully under-
stood; however, by keeping the model on these five cards,
the user will find program editing is much easier with the
built in extra room on each card.
Note that the data base card contains not only the perma-
nent data base, but also the intermediate data base. The
permanent data base remains unaltered throughout execution,
while the intermediate data base is continually changed during
the operation of each program module. Care must be exercised
in the interpretation of data extracted from the base since
values in various memory registers will be changed during
execution of the program. Annex 3 delineates both the perma-
nent and intermediate data bases and indicates what values
are in the intermediate base depending on which module is
being used.
The program listing in Annex 2 contains some non-standard
symbols for various key strokes to facilitate typing. These
are completely explained in that Annex, but the user should
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note that these symbols will not be what he would see if the
program is listed using a printer.
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ANNEX 1: USING THE PARET MODEL
In the description below, it is assumed that the user has
some previous experience using the TI 59 programmable calculator
For example, explicit instructions for reading cards into the
memory set will not be given. Should problems be encountered,
the reader should refer to Personal Programming
,
the TI 59
manual supplied with the machine.









Data Base: card 6
Refer to this listing when using the instructions below. Card
6 is read into memory at the beginning of a model run and
should not be repeated once a sequence of battles has begun
since data is continually generated during execution. Note
also that the program does not contain the commands clear (CLR)
or reset (RST) , and these commands should not be given from
the keyboard during execution. Flags are used throughout the
program, and either of these two commands will reset all flags
which have been set. For example, the subroutine which senses
day and night conditions uses a flag; if clear or reset are
given from the keyboard during a night phase, the model will
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change to daylight operations and will subtract 24 hours from
the displayed time.
The following conventions will be used to list the steps
required for the use of each module: data (key) display. When
no data is required as input for a step, or when the display
has no meaning, those positions will be left blank for that
step. XT refers to the "x exchange t" key on the keyboard,




a. read in card 6 (banks 3 and 4)
b. read in card 1
c. (E') initializes calculator, only do for first
battle of a sequence
d. red starting force (A) red starting force
e. blue starting force (R/S) battle time
f. rate of advance (B) interdicted rate of advance
g. distance to battle site (C)
h. distance to maintenance colleciton point (R/S)
i. (D) critical time
j. (E) number of vehicles to be recovered by recovery
vehicles
k. (R/S) blue survivors
1. (XT) red survivors
aa. read in card 2
bb. number of recovery vehicles available (A') expected
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time to recover force
cc. (B') expected percentage recovered without
daisychaining
dd. (R/S) expected percentage recovered using
daisychaining
ee. (A') expected time to recover the force with daisy-
chaining (this is an optional step, and is only
done when the decision is made to daisychain)
ff. (C) number of recovery vehicles killed during the
movement phase
gg. (XT) number of recovery vehicles killed on the
battle site
2. Module B
a. read in card 3
b. (A) total elapsed time
c. (B) maximum number of recoveries possible in the time
allowed
d. number of vehicles recovered (C) loss coefficient
e. 1 for tank or 2 for TOW (D) number of m,f and k kills
by level of maintenance (after first number is displayed,
R/S will display succeeding numbers for organizational
and then direct support maintenance)
f. (A') total elapsed time (this step is necessary to clear
a fixup taken in step e, and also determines whether to
play day or night parameters based on total elapsed time)
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Note: If the printer is used with the calculator, the output
from step e is automatically listed in the order given above,
i.e., first organizational and then direct support m,f and k
kills.
3. Module C
a. read in card 4
b. (A) expected return times for organizational m,f and
k kills (use the R/S method to obtain all times for
this step and step c, as was done for step e above)
c. (B) expected return times for direct support m,f and
k kills
d. (C) expected number of recovery vehicles requiring
organizational maintenance
e. type recovery vehicle C1=M88, 2=M578, 3=M553) (D)
f. number recovery vehicles available (E) number
recovery vehicles "up" for next iteration
4. Module D
a. read in card 5
b. number recovery vehicles expected to go to GS mainte-
nance (A)
c. number vehicles actually recovered (R/S) number of
HET's required
d. (B) expected time of return of HET's to the MCP
While using the model, the user must track some of the
output variables manually since the program is not designed
to provide summary statistics in all cases. For example,
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the HET requirement generated in module D does not auto-
matically decide the requirement based on present time. The
output from step c above only takes into account the situation
it is presented with in making the determination; the user
must manually track how many HET ' s are currently at the MCP
and make the determination as to how many additional HET's
will be required. Similarly, the expected return times from
maintenance are not expressed in "real" time, but rather in
the number of hours to return; the user must add present clock
time to that number to determine the time of return of the
combat vehicles in real time. These modifications to the
program, although simple to make, were not done in order to
conserve space in the calculator.
Standard partitioning (.479.59) was maintained throughout
the model, but if the user decides to leave the model in its
present spread-out form, repartitioning would be desireable
in some cases to add the features mentioned above. Also note
that this version of PARET was designed around the Ap-
plied Statistics Module, but to use the Master Library Module,
the only change which must be made in the codeing is to change
every "PGM 05" to "PGM 02." If this change is not made, and
the Master Library is used, some portions of the model will




ANNEX 2: PROGRAM LISTING
Listed below is the program for the PARET model. Since
each card is designed to perform various functions, the program
is listed by card rather than by module. Some of the keystrokes
from the calculator are not directly reproduceable here, so
the following conventions will be used for those cases:
XT = X exchange t
GE = X greater than or equal to t
LT = X less than t
PR = polar to rectangular
SQRT = square root of X
SQ = X squared
ABS = absolute value of x
* = multiplication
** = division
All other keystrokes can be easily reproduced and will be
written as they would appear when using the printer with the
calculator. The program is listed left to right; the number
at the beginning of each line refers to the last command on




A(OOl), B(063), C(079), D(1Q3), EC135), LNX(171), TANC195),
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EXC(208), ( (221), SUM(235), E'C251), A' (257)
Flags Used ; None
LBL A STO 27 R/S STO 28 SBR ( RCL 27 ** RCL 28 ) STO
07 SQ * ( 1 - RCL 32 SQ ) ) +/-+ RCL 30 ) STO 00 OP 10
XT GE A' RCL 00 SQRT + (RCL 32 * RCL 07 +/- ) ) **
( RCL 30 SQRT - RCL 07 ) ) LNX ** RCL 30 SQRT ) STO 08
R/S LBL B STO 14 3 5 STO 20 RCL 34 SBR SUM INV PRD 14
R/S LBL C ** RCL 36 ) STO 15 RCL 37 * RCL 15 ) SUM 15
). R/S ** RCL 36 ) STO 16 R/S LBL D 5 + RCL 08 ) - RCL
08 * RCL 14) ** RCL 14 ) STO 17 4 1 STO 20 RCL 40 SBR
SUM SUM 17 RCL 08 + RCL 17 ) STO 18 RCL 30 X RCL 08 ) *
( RCL 27 * (1 - RCL 3 2) ) ) +/- SUM 18 RCL 18 R/S LBL
E RCL 28 - (RCL 27 - RCL 32 * RCL 27 ) ** RCL 30 ) )
STO 26 RCL 28 - RCL 26 ) STO 19 2 XT RCL 18 GE TAN LBL
LNX RCL 19 * RCL 33 ) INV SUM 19 RCL 19 * RCL 42 ) INV
SUM 19 RCL 19 GTO EXC LBL .07* RCL 19 ) SUM 26 GTO
LNX LBL EXC R/S RCL 27 * RCL 32 ) XT RCL 26 R/S LBL
( RCL 56 * RCL 28 ) +/- INV LNX STO 30 RTN LBL SUM PGM
02 A RC* 20 PGM 02 B PGM 02 C RTN LBL E' STO 57 RTN




A(OOl), LOG(027), PR(049) , SIN(llO), SQRT(120), SQ(126), CE(144),





Flags Used: 2 and 3
Program:
LBL A STO 07 STO 2 2 SBR SQRT RCL 19 ** RCL 07 ) STO 21 *
2 - 1 ) STO 23 IFF 03 FIX LBL LOG RCL 23 * ( RCL 39 +
RCL 16 ) ) + RCL 23 * RCL 16 ) + RCL 15 ) STO 51 RTN LBL
PR 4 6 STO 20 RCL 45 SBR SUM +/- + 1 ) STO 2 3 SBR CE RCL
39 * RCL 50 ) + RCL 23 * RCL 39 ) STO 24 * RCL 00 ) +/-
SUM 24 RCL 43 PRD 24 RCL 24 LNX 1/X ABS STO 2 5 SBR SIN
DSZ 07 PR RCL 59 STO 58 RTN LBL SIN SBR CE XT RCL 25
GE SQRT RTN LBL SQRT 1 SUM 59 RTN LBL SQ RCL 29 PGM 2
A RCL 41 PGM 02 B PGM 02 D STO 39 RTN LBL CE PGM 02 SBR
DMS STO 00 RTN LBL SUM PGM 02 A RC* 20 PGM 02 B PGM 02 C
RTN LBL C INV STF 03 STO 52 LBL +/- STO 5 9 DEG RCL
15 TAN SQRT STO 25 LBL 1/X SBR SIN DSZ 07 1/X RCL 59
SUM 52 IFF 2 EE STF 02 RCL 22 - RCL 52 ) STO 7 SBR
PR RCL 22 - RCL 52 - RCL 58 ) STO 07 RCL 16 STO 15 GTO
+/- LBL EE INV STF 02 RCL 58 XT RCL 52 SUM 58 RTN LBL
B RCL 18 ** RCL 51 ) * RCL 19 ) STO 54 RCL 18 * 2 )
STO 24 RCL 51 + RCL 51 * . 5 ) STO 25 RCL 24 ** RCL 25 )
* RCL 19 ) STO 55 RCL 54 ** RCL 19 ) RTN RCL 55 ** RCL
19 I R/S LBL A' STF 0.3 RCL 21 STO 18 2 PRD 39 1 . 5 PRD
16 RCL 07 A RTN LBL FIX 2 INV PRD 23 GTO LOG RTN
3. Card 3
Labels Used ;
B(OOl), X(033) , C(38), DEG(049) , D(065), LNX(079), ( (087),





. 3 3 STO 14 . 5 8 STO 15 RCL 18 ** RCL 51 ) * RCL
19 ) STO 59 RCL 19- XT RCL 59 GE X RTN LBL X RCL 19 RTN LBL
C STO 59 RCL 58 ** RCL 59 ) R/S LBL DEC RC* 20 PGM 02
A RCL 21 PGM 02 B PGM 02 D RTN LBL D XT 1 EQ LNX RCL 19
*
. 6 ) GTO ( LBL LNX RCL 19 * . 4 ) LBL ( STO 25 1 4
STO 20 . 1 STO 21 SBR DEG * RCL 25 ) STO 23 4 7 STO
20 SBR DE * RCL 2 3 ) STO 08 4 8 STO 20 SBR DEG * RCL
23 ) STO 16 RCL 23 - ( RCL 08 + RCL 16 ) ) STO 17 RCL
8 PRT ADV RCL 16 PRT ADV RCL 17 PRT RCL 25 - RCL 23
) STO 25 1 5 STO 20 SBR DEG * RCL 25 ) STO 23 4 7 STO 20
SBR DEG * RCL 23 ) STO 54 4 8 STO 20 SBR DEG * RCL 23 )
STO 24 RCL 23 - ( RCL 54 + RCL 24 ) ) STO 25 RCL 54
PRT ADV RCL 24 PRT ADV RCL 25 PRT RCL 08 FIX 00 RTN
RCL 16 R/S RCL 17 R/S RCL 54 R/S RCL 24 R/S RCL 25 R/S
LBL A' INV FIX IFF 01 SQ 1 4 XT RCL 57 GE CLR GTO Y^
LBL CLR STF 01 . 5 SUM 37 2 INV PRD 36 RCL 43 * 1
) STO 31 INV PRD 43 . 3 SUM 29 . 5 INV SUM 30 GTO Y^
LBL SQ 2 4 XT RCL 57 GE ** GTO Y^ LBL ** . 5 INV SUM
37 2 PRD 36 RCL 31 ** 1 ) STO 43 . 3 INV SUM 29 . 5
SUM 30 INV STF 01 RCL 57 - 2 4 ) STO 57 LBL Y^ RTN LBL




A(OOl), EXC(027), PRD(061), COS(098), DEG(128), SUM(144),
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B(151), SIN(172), ENG(209), LOG(246), C(276), TAN(285),
RAD(299), Y^(306), D(311), LNX(326) , 1/XC334), E(342),
PR(361)
Flags Used ; None
Program ;
LBL A STO 00 07 RCL 08 INT STO 08 . 5 STO 21 6 . 4
4 STO 23 2 3 STO 20 LBL EXC SBR DEG PRT ADV OP 20 SUM
07 DSZ 08 EXC RCL 07 ** RCL 00 ) STO 44 STO 00 STO
07 RCL 16 INT STO 08 4 STO 23 LBL PRD SBR DEG PRT ADV
OP 20 SUM 07 DSZ 08 PRD RCL 07 ** RCL 00) STO 19 STO
00 STO 07 RCL 17 INT STO 08 2 1 . 1 STO 23 LBL COS
SBR DEG PRT ADV OP 20 SUM 07 DSZ 08 COS RCL 07 ** RCL 00
) STO 22 RCL 44 RTN RCL 19 R/S RCL 22 R/S LBL DEG RC*
20 PGM 02 A RCL 21 PGM 02 B PGM 02 D RTN LBL SUM PGM
02 SBR DMS RTN LBL B STO 00 STO 7 RCL 54 INT STO
08 2 STO 21 1 6 . 3 STO 23 LBL SIN SBR DEG PRT AD OP
20 SUM 07 DSZ 08 SIN RCL 07 ** RCL 00 ) STO 44 STO
00 STO 07 RCL 24 INT STO 08 2 2 . 9 STO 2 3 LBL ENG SBR
DEG PRT AD OP 20 SUM 07 DSZ 08 ENG RCL 07 ** RCL 00 )
STO 19 STO 00 STO 07 RCL 25 INT STO 08 4 7 . 9 STO
23 LBL LOG SBR DEG PRT ADV OP 20 SUM 07 DSZ 08 LOG RCL
07 ** RCL 00 ) STO 22 RCL 44 RTN RCL 19 R/S RCL 22 R/S
LBL C STO 00 RCL 58 STO 08 LBL TAN SBR SUM XT . 2 GE
RAD DSZ 08 TAN GTO Y^ LBL RAD OP 20 DSZ 08 TAN LBL Y^




. 8 7 STO 00 RTN LBL 1/X . 8 2 STO RTN LBL E STO 07
. 1 5 STO 21 STO 20 SBR DEC * RCL 07 ) XT RCL 07 INV
GE PR XT RTN LBL PR RCL 7 RTN
5. Card 5
Labels Used ;
A(OOl) , SQRT(201), B(206)
Flags Used ; None
Program ;
LBL A STO 55 R/S ** ( 1 - RCL 42 ) ) - ( ( RCL 08 + RCL 16
+ RCL 17 + RCL 24 + RCL 25 + RCL '54 ) ** ( 1 -RCL 42 ) ) ) STO
53 RCL 24 + RCL 25 + RCL *^ ( 1 - RCL 42 ) ) STO 08 *
. 4 ) STO 10 RCL 08 - RCL 10 ) ** 2 ) SUM 10 . 6 7 STO
09 ** 2 ) STO 04 6 STO 15 ** 2 ) STO 16 2 STO 00
7 5 STO ol RCL 09 + RCL 04 + ( RCL 00 ** RCL 15 ) + (
RCL 00 ** RCL 16 )) STO 02 RCL 09 + RCL 04 + ( RCL 01
** RCL 15 ) + ( RCL 01 ** RCL 16 ) ) STO 03 RCL 53 *
. 4 ) SUM 55 RCL 53 * . 6 ) ** 2 ) SUM 55 RCL 18 **
RCL 2 ) 1/X * RCL 10 ) STO 05 RCL 55 XT RCL 05 GE SQRT RCL
55 RTN LBL SQRT RCL 5 RTN LBL B RCL 03 + RCL 57 ) RTN
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ANNEX 3: DATA BASE
All 6 memory locations are used in the execution of
the PARET model. Many of these storage locations are used
repetitively during execution, and some form the permanent
data base. The permanent data base forms the basis of many
of the assumptions made in the model; changing these perma-
nent variables causes direct changes in the output data.
Listed below are the contents of each data register. The
number on the left corresponds to the register number. A (*)
indicates that register is in the permanent data base, and
therefore remains unchanged during program execution. When
"computation" is listed in a register location, that register
is used in arithmetic operations during execution and is not
used for storage of any data to be used past the immediate
routine accessing that register. In those cases where values
other than computation are listed in the non-permanent data
registers, those values form the intermediate data base, and
are generally held in that location until the end of the exe-
cution of that module in which they are generated. By care-
fully restructuring the use of the memory locations, it would
be possible to free up other memory locations to add to the
permanent data base for future expansions of the program. Values
listed sequentially are listed in the order in which they are
generated within the model; the program listing provides
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detailed information on the time that each of these locations
is initially filled within each module.
register contents
00 computation
01-06 used by random number routine
07 force ratio/number of recovery vehicles available/
m kills
08 time of battle/m organizational kills
09-13 used by random number routine
14 interdicted rate of advance/organizational %
15 time to reach battle site/direct support %
16 time to reach MCP/f organizational kills
17 time to rollup and recover/k organizational kills
18 (*) time available for recovery
19 (*) number of vehicles practical to recover
20-21 computation
22 (*) number of recovery vehicles available
23 computation
24 computation/f direct support kills
25 probability of hit (recovery vehicle) /k direct
support kills
26 C*) blue survivors
27 C*) red starting force
28 (*) blue starting force




30 (*) exchange ratio
31 computation
32 (*) red breakpoint
33 (*) % of combat vehicles which are unrecoverable
34-35 (*) interdiction limits (e.g. 1 and 2 allow up to
50% interdiction)
36 (*) recovery vehicle cross country speed
37 (*) disorientation factor
38-39 computation
40-41 (*) rollup and recovery limits Chours)
42 (*) % self/like recovery
43 (*) % line of sight factor
44 computation/f kills
45-46 (*) probability of identification limits
47-49 (*) %, m,f and k kills
50 C*) inverse of recovery vehicle's priority as red
target
51 (*) time to recover the force
52 (*) number of recovery vehicles killed during movement
53 computation
54 computation/jn direct support kills
55 computation
56 (*) exchange ratio factor
57 (*) total clock time





























HET DS turn around time
initial blue force
red force break point
blue survivors
HET GS turn around time
recovery vehicle disorientation factor
minimum HET requirement for DS evacuation
minimum HET forecast
exchange ratio constant
probability of line of sight
maximum number of trips to DS for HET's
expected number of vehicles recovered
number of recovery candidates
probability of kill
HET equivalents for GS
interdicted rate of advance
initial red force
red survivors
blue suppressive fire factor
time of battle
critical time
expected time to recover the force




TE time of exposure
X exchange ratio
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